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ABSTRACT 
 
The primary focus of the paper is the study of the colonial construction of the 
Gorkha identity and its later day crisis. Taking the colonial encounter as the 
historic moment of its evolution, the paper makes an attempt to map the 
formation of the Gorkha identity over the last two hundred years or so by locating 
the process of formation within the colonial public sphere that emerged in 
Darjeeling in the early part of the twentieth century. The paper tries to cast new 
light on the nature of contestation and conflation between the colonial identity or 
the martial identity inscribed on the body of the Gorkha by the colonial discourse 
of “martial race” and the cultural identity that was emerging in course of time. It 
also tries to establish the fact that the colonial forms of representation of the 
“Gurkhas” as the “martial race” is still the dominant form of representation 
foreclosing all other forms of representation that had become possible as a new 
self-identity emerged with the cultural renaissance in Darjeeling and elsewhere. It 
also looks into the problem of double consciousness of the deterritorialised 
Gorkha subjectivity that is torn between two seemingly conflictual impulses of a 
primordially constructed notion of the Gorkha jati (community) and the demands 
of a modern nation-state. The paper also argues that the Gorkha identity has 
somewhat failed in securing a political space for its cultural identity leading to 
deep fissures in its multi layered identity. 
 
“Critique is the movement by which the subject gives itself the right to 
question truth on its effects of power and to question power on its 
discourses of truth…in a word, the politics of truth.” 
   Michel Foucault 
 
 
Introduction 
The phase we are living in is one of the most crucial in human 
history. It is a phase marked by contradictions and confusions, and a 
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phase that is increasingly characterised by the interplay of two 
seemingly opposing and yet complementary forces of essentialism 
and hybridity. At one end of the continuum is a growing tendency 
in global political and economic forces towards greater integration - 
one that is stoked by the continual movement of people and their 
cultural baggage across the boundaries of nation-states, throwing up 
new forms of trans-national practices, locations, solidarities, and 
institutions that do not strictly conform to the demands and logic of 
the nation-state. In fact, theorists like Arjun Appadurai have already 
written obituaries of the nation-state.
1
 At the other end of the same 
continuum, still newer forms of micro politics have secured moral 
legitimation, marking a distinctive shift towards the fragmentation 
of the cultural landscape.
2
 
  In the backdrop of this, the question of identity has saddled 
itself firmly at the centre stage of both academic and political 
debates. The argument in essence is that the old identities that had 
stabilised the social world for so long are in decline, giving rise to 
new identities and fragmenting the modern individual as a unified 
subject. The ‘crisis of identity’ is now increasingly seen as a part of 
a wider process of change which is dislocating the central structures 
and processes of modern societies and undermining the framework 
which had until now given the individual a stable anchorage in the 
social world.
3
 In the rarefied terrain of academics we are witnessing 
debates that raise significant questions about the very legitimacy of 
the fundamental axioms of enlightenment and the way ‘history’ has 
been conceptualised as an irreversible process of modernity. With 
this movement, the earlier notion of a universal human subject has 
come under serious attack and the notion of a ‘decentered subject’ 
seems to be acquiring greater salience in academic parlance. 
                                                 
1 Arjun Appadurai, “Patriotism and Its Futures”, in his Modernity at Large: 
Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 
1997, pp. 158-177. 
2 Yogendra Singh, “A Life-World of Disenchantment: Modernity, Ethnicity and 
Pluralism”, in Sociological Bulletin, Vol.4, No.2. September 1998, pp. 155-165. 
3 Stuart Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity”, in Stuart Hall, David Hall, et. 
al. (ed.) Modernity and Its Futures, Polity Press, in association with Open 
University, 1992, p. 275. 
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 It is in such an academic climate that this paper will try to 
understand the emergence and formation of the Gorkha
4
/Nepali 
identity in India spanning a period of over two hundred years and 
its continuing crisis. The crisis of identity is nothing new to the 
Gorkhas in India. It was co-opted together with the people as they 
were introduced to ‘Civilisation’ and ‘History’. And with the 
passing of time it has only become that much more convoluted and 
complex. At a much deeper level, the problem of identity is in fact 
the problem of modernity. One of the most enduring and lasting 
features of modernity is the necessity of all modern subjects to 
organise themselves around the normative idea of nation.
5
 The 
modern identities circumscribed as they are by the symbolic 
boundaries of the nation are mediated by the complex discursive 
structures of national culture and national identity. In such a 
situation the problem of Gorkha identity cannot be understood in 
isolation. The need here is to locate it within the complex matrix of 
nation, space, territory, culture, race, and history. It is by 
understanding the nature and dynamics of the discursive formations 
of these structures that our effort to deconstruct the Gorkha identity 
may come to fruition. This paper in that sense is a preliminary 
attempt to theorise the Gorkha identity by locating it in these 
discursive structures. In what follows, I will make a modest attempt 
to contextualise the emergence of Gorkha identity in nineteenth 
                                                 
4 The word `Gorkha’ comes from the small principality (now a district) in Nepal 
by the same name. The kingdom of Gorkha was established by Drabya Shah in 
1559. It is located 40 miles west of Kathmandu. The names `Gorkha’ and 
`Nepali’ are used interchangeably in India although political movements at 
different times have favoured the use of the word Gorkha over Nepali in order to 
differentiate between the citizens of Nepal and India.  T B Subba has devised an 
ingenious way differentiating them.  He spells the citizens of Nepal as 
“Nepalese”, and the Nepali speaking Indians as “Nepalis”. See his, Ethnicity, 
State and Development: A Case Study of the Gorkhaland Movement, Vikas, New 
Delhi, 1992, pp. 67-74. 
5 Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that European imperialism and third world 
nationalism have together achieved the universalisation of the nation-state as the 
most desirable form of political community. See his “Postcoloniality and the 
Artifice of History: Who Speaks for the Indian Past?” in Padmini Mongia (ed.), 
Contemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi, 1997, p. 240. 
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century colonial India, tracing its origins in the British colonial 
discourse particularly in their ethnographical writings on “martial 
race”. Taking the colonial encounter as the historical moment of its 
evolution, the paper will try to map the formation of the Gorkha 
identity through an inter-textual discourse study within the context 
of the colonial public sphere and the liberal nationalist 
historiography of colonial India. Further, I shall argue that the 
problem of Gorkha identity exits at two levels. One, the very idea of 
Gorkha identity is inscribed on the body of the individual Gorkha 
by the colonial discourse. At another level, the historical experience 
of the Gorkha creates a sense of a deterritorialised Gorkha 
subjectivity, torn between two seemingly conflictual impulses of a 
primordially constructed notion of Gorkha jati (community) and the 
demands of a modern nation-state.  
 
The poverty of academic research and the question of Gorkha 
identity  
The ‘life-world’ of the Gorkhas in India is located both literally and 
figuratively on the margins of the imagined nation. This 
‘marginality’ is not merely a location but a byword for the 
oppressed and dispossessed. It is characterised by the dispossession 
of narratives, the cannibalistic appropriation and the continuing 
colonisation of their epistemological grid. For the most part, it 
occupies a peripheral location in relation to the metropolitan 
academic research. It remains an under-researched terrain, in which 
the standards of the scholarship emerging from these locations 
struggle to measure up to the standards set by the `mainstream’ 
academia, which on its part forms a peripheral location vis-a-vis the 
metropolitan academia. The Gorkhas who were historically 
subjected to the Orientalist gaze of colonial humanist anthropology 
continues to remain the subject of discourse. From such a 
standpoint, the academic discourses on the problem of Gorkha 
identity, emerging both from within and without appears skewed 
and stifled by the disciplinary contours of traditional methods of 
social enquiry. Their narratives revolve around the idea of the 
Gorkhas as an exclusive ethnic group juxtaposed with the liberal 
nationalist imagination of the Indian nation. There does exists some 
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commendable works on identity formation, particularly the 
importance they have laid on collective memory of home and the 
experience of migration, and the changing structure of caste and 
village settlements.
6
 However, a comprehensive study of the 
contributions of social and cultural movements in Darjeeling and 
elsewhere towards the formation of a distinct Gorkha identity still 
eludes us. What is clear in these scholarships and other forms of 
utterances, especially the ones that have come from within, is the 
evidence of the fundamental fissures that are located in the 
interstices of the subjectivity of the Gorkha. Barring a handful of 
works which can be called insurrectionary, majority of these tend to 
revolve around the celebration of the famed “bravery” of the 
“Gurkhas”.
7
 Girdled by the colonial constraints of valour and its 
validation, the Gorkha subject appears ambivalent towards 
colonialism. Colonialism is often understood in a periodic sense 
rather than a well-defined set of discursive practices outliving the 
formal end of the more brutal forms of rule.  
What is completely missed out here is the reality of the 
continuing discursive colonisation of the Gorkha identity. Similar is 
the case with the studies on the more recent movements of the 
Gorkhas for statehood. There is a marked tendency in these works 
to explain it away as stemming from economic causes like relative 
deprivation or internal colonialism - one that informs the 
paternalistic policies of the Indian state - or it is simply pitched as a 
case of ethnic exclusivism and “separatism”. Both forms of 
scholarship suffer from reductionism. Either it is an instrumentalist 
understanding of the problem, or worse still, it is about constructing 
an identity in the most essentialist image. The missing link in both 
these genres of works is colonialism. It is not as if these 
interpretative gestures and exercises have ignored the colonial 
history, but where they have failed is in the diachronic 
                                                 
6 On the factor of migration and memory, see Kumar Pradhan’s Pahilo Pahar, 
Shyam Prakashan, Darjeeling, 1982. On the changing nature of caste structure, 
see T B Subba’s, “Caste Relations in Nepal and India”, in Social Change, Vol.15, 
No.4, December 1985, pp. 23-26. 
7 In Western writings, the word Gorkha is spelt as “Gurkha” or “Goorkha”. 
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comprehension of the colonial primaries of the Gorkha identity-
formation. We shall return to discuss all these, particularly the 
relations of power as it is reflected in our historiography and 
nationalist imagination, a little later. 
 Identities are as much self-constructed as it is constructed by 
the other. In that sense there appears a fundamental difference in the 
manner in which the Gorkha identity or the Gorkha ‘jati’ is 
imagined by the ‘self’, and the way the Gorkha identity is 
conceptualised in the metropolitan as well as in the `mainstream’ 
Indian academic discourses. There appears a significant gap in the 
meanings of the word jati. Even while admitting that the word jati 
is a loose term that allows a wide array of meanings within its 
semantic field, Gorkha jati in the culturally specific sense signifies 
a cultural identity, expressed through imageries and symbols 
derived from its composite culture.
8
 The Indian `mainstream’ 
academic discourses in their turn have merely derived from the 
metropolitan academia. Since the `mainstream’ academia looks at 
the peripheral identities and their narratives through the Western 
lenses, it takes a derivative form.
9
  
 
The “Gurkha” as the subject of discourse and their history 
The “Gurkha” identity as a “martial race” is largely the ‘discovery’ 
of the ethnographical knowledge of the colonial state. This 
discovery marks off the colonial state’s shift in its emphasis from 
the brutal modes of conquest to cultural technologies of rule - the 
production of colonial knowledge.
10
 A lot has been written about 
                                                 
8 Kumar Pradhan talks about the multiple meanings of the word Nepali, viz, a 
language, a citizen of Nepal, and as a cultural identity. See his Pahilo Pahar, op. 
cit. p.4. 
9 Partha Chatterjee, while commenting on the nature of anti-colonial nationalism 
says that while nationalism challenged the colonial claim to domination, it also 
accepted the very intellectual premises of ‘modernity’ on which colonial 
domination was based. See his Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A 
Derivative Discourse, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1996, p.30. 
10 Nicholas B. Dirks, “Foreword”, in Bernard Cohn’s, Colonialism and Its Forms 
of Knowledge: The British in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002, p. 
ix. Also see, Bernard Cohn and Nicholas B. Dirks, “Beyond the Fringe: The 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 2, Numbers 1 & 2, 2006. 
 
 29 
the ‘short, broad chested, flat faced, snub nosed men with their 
khukuris’
11
. In one of the ironies of history, it was the defeat of the 
Gorkha soldiers under Amar Singh Thapa that led to the ‘discovery’ 
of the “Gurkhas”. Numerous reasons ranging from the ‘run of 
reverses and deaths of veteran English generals in the war’ inspiring 
awe for the Gorkha soldiers,
12
 the Company’s desire to cut down 
the number of Hindus with ‘brahmanical prejudices’, to the 
‘growing Russian threat to the British Empire from the North 
Western frontiers necessitating the shifting of the base of 
recruitment from Madras and Bombay towards Punjab and Nepal’ 
have been cited for the Company’s decision to enlist  the Gorkhas 
in the British Indian Army.
13
 
 It is indeed important to contextualise the decision to recruit 
the “Gurkhas” in the political requirements of the colonial state. 
The imperatives of Empire building had prompted the British into 
thinking that it would be better and cheaper to dominate the world if 
the natives could be induced to shoulder much of the Whiteman’s 
military burden.
14
 But to attribute the decision to the political 
exigencies alone is to over simplify the issue. Furthermore, Lionel 
Caplan argues that ‘the theory of martial race did not emerge sui 
generis to meet specific military needs, rather it was a deeper 
manifestation of the wider European doctrine of biological 
determinism or scientific racism’.
15
 Hence the search for the best 
“fighting material”.  
                                                                                                               
Nation State, Colonialism, and the Technologies of Power”, Journal of Historical 
Sociology, Vol.1, No. 2, June 1988, pp. 224–229. 
11 Kamal Raj Singh Rathaur, The Gurkhas: A History of Recruitment in the 
British Indian Army, Nirala Publications, New Delhi, 1983, p. 33. 
12 Kanchanmoy Mozumdar, “Recruitment of the Gurkhas in the Indian Army, 
1814 – 1877”, The Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. 
lxxxxiii, April – June 1963, p. 143. 
13 David Omissi, “The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940”, 
McMillan Press Ltd, 1994, p.12. 
14 Ibid., p.2.  
15 Lionel Caplan, “Martial Gurkhas: The Persistence of a Military Discourse on 
‘Race’ ” in Peter Robb (ed.), The Concept of Race in South Asia, Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi, 2006, p. 261. 
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 The discourse on martial race occupies an important place in 
the larger scheme of colonial knowledge and its relation with power 
and domination. The underlying idea of “martial race” was 
elegantly outlined by Lieutenant-General Sir George MacMunn in 
his, The Armies of India (1911) in the following way: “It is one of 
the essential differences between the East and the West, that in the 
East, with certain exceptions, only certain clans and classes can 
bear arms; others have not the physical courage necessary for the 
warrior. In Europe as we know, every able bodied man, given food 
and arms, is a fighting man of sort…In the East, or certainly in 
India, this is not so…Nor are appearances of any use as a criteria. 
Some of the most manly looking people in India are in this respect 
the most despicable.”
16
 The theory had two main strands. One, it 
was based on the idea of natural qualities, emphasising that 
martiality was an inherited trait and therefore an aspect of ‘race’. 
Secondly, martial thinking introduced an element of environmental 
determinism. It was argued that warlike people were to be found in 
hilly, cooler places, while in hot, flat regions, races were supposed 
to be timid, servile and unwarlike.
17
   
 Within a short time, martial race enthusiasts not only 
reshaped the British Indian army but also systematised the new 
discourse. Towards the end of the late 1890s, the “martial races” 
began to be codified in a series of official “Recruiting Handbooks” 
for the different classes of the Indian Army, which were almost 
invariably written by British officers long acquainted with the 
troops concerned. Here, Caplan makes an interesting observation 
about the long existing huge body of literature on the ‘Gurkhas’. He 
senses a strong current of ‘consensus and continuity in them, 
coming across as monolithic and timeless, relying heavily on 
stereotype, and with little political and historical content’.
18
 The 
atomizing effect of the ethnographic enumeration of the ‘Gurkhas’ 
                                                 
16 Quoted in Lionel Caplan’s, “Bravest of the Brave: Representation of ‘The 
Gurkha’ in the British Military Writings”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol.25, No.3, 
July 1991, p.580. 
17 Lionel Caplan, (2006), op. cit., pp.260-261. 
18 Lionel Caplan, (1991), op. cit., p.573. 
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into smallest meaningful component led to the essentialisation of 
the Gorkha traditions. Furthermore, the working of the Foucauldian 
‘system of dispersion’ is quite clear in the colonial representation of 
the ‘Gurkhas’. In a strange way, the British admiration of the 
‘Gurkhas’ was reserved to the ordinary soldiers only and not to the 
Gorkha officers.  Moreover, the discourse on martial race was as 
much about the praise of the dogged bravery and masculine 
qualities of the Gorkhas as it was about highlighting the cultural 
difference. Thus it was a commonplace belief that the ‘Gurkhas’ 
could realize their enormous potential only under the tutelage, 
supervision and leadership of British officers. The ‘bravery’ of the 
‘Gurkha’ was considered to be a danger to him, forcing the British 
to keep him under continuous supervision. Eden Vansittart, one of 
the illustrious recruiting officers, is supposed to have remarked that 
‘without a strong hand they [the Gurkhas] would very soon 
deteriorate and become slovenly’.
19
 Choicest of racist labels like 
‘tykes’, ‘little highlanders’, ‘little Gurkha’, ‘little blighters’, 
‘doughty little Mongolian hillmen’ were used even as they 
fetishised him.
20
  One of the common jokes about the Gorkhas that 
did the round was about a mule that went lame when he kicked a 
Gurkha head while the Gurkha got a slight headache.
21
   
 Colonialism aestheticised the native Gorkhas in a typically 
Orientalist image, who squatting next to the white man would add 
the charm of a simple and unsophisticated native to his 
prepossessing presence. It was a deliberate policy on the part of the 
British to recruit from the most illiterate and remote regions of 
Nepal. The search for the most authentic Gorkha would force the 
gallawalas (local appellation for recruiting agents) go deep into the 
interiors of Nepal to prise open his pristine habitat. Scientific racism 
had led the British into believing that an ethnic group could be 
martial only in one’s own territory. It was commonly held that the 
Magars and Gurungs, who had migrated to east Nepal, would cease 
to be martial because intermarriage would lead to the contamination 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p.573. 
20 Ibid., p.573. 
21 Omissi, op. cit., p. 26. 
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of their blood which carried military qualities. Jeffrey Greenhut, 
while discussing the structure of the racist British Indian Army, 
says that ‘Indians who were intelligent were labelled as cowards, 
while those defined as brave were uneducated and backward. In 
such a case, the British Gentlemen stood to combine both 
intelligence and courage necessary for a man to become officer’.
22
 
If the Bengalis were ‘effeminate’ then the Gurkhas had to be 
‘brave’. 
 The colonial state through various measures ensured that 
those who joined the ranks of its army are treated well back in their 
society. In 1899, Field-Marshal Lord Roberts revived a dormant 
order granting soldiers precedence in hearing of civil suits. Five 
years later Lord Kitchener persuaded the Prime Minister of Nepal to 
exempt former Gorkha soldiers from corvee works. Many of them 
were honoured on public and festive occasions.
23
 The discourse on 
martial race and the subsequent enlistment of the Gorkhas into the 
British Indian Army changed the entire course of the Gorkha 
history. At the discursive level, the colonial state firmly placed its 
control over the hill societies by ‘civilising’ and ‘normalising’ the 
‘frontiers’. It also collapsed multiple identities and fluidities, typical 
of the Gorkha society then, and represented them as a single 
identity - the martial identity. The ethnic identities were stereotyped 
and continuously reproduced through a discursive practice. In fine, 
colonialism violently disrupted the social-conceptual world of the 
Gorkhas, taking away his freedom by permanently colonising his 
body. The Gorkha subject was dislocated by stripping off his past 
and relocated him back again as a deterritorialised subject of 
“History”.  
 Three battalions of Gurkha regiments were raised as early as 
1815.
24
 By the time Sepoy Mutiny was crushed, the Gorkhas had 
                                                 
22 Jeffrey Greenhut, “Sahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between 
Officers and Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army”, Military Affairs, 
Vol.48, No.1, January 1984, pp.15-16. 
23 Omissi, op. cit., pp.68-69. 
24 For details, see Kanchanmoy Mozumdar, op. cit.  
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proved their masters right. A series of recruiting depots came up 
along the long stretch of areas bordering Nepal. By 1864, the 
British government issued a charter providing for the Gorkha 
Regiment to buy land for settlement stations at Dharmasala, 
Dehradun, Almora, Gorakhpur, Shillong, etc. In Darjeeling, the 
Gorkha Recruitment Depot was opened in 1890, and it continues to 
draw recruits from in and around Darjeeling and neighbouring 
Nepal. By January 1904, nearly 57% of the Indian Army (86,841) 
came from Punjab, Nepal or the Frontier.
25
 Though some changes 
have been brought about in the recruitment policy since 
Independence, the discourse of martial race continues to be the 
guiding principle for recruitment of groups like the Gorkhas and 
Sikhs to the Indian Army.
26
 
 
Colonial capitalism, plantation labour and the history of 
Darjeeling  
Much of the early history of Darjeeling remains in oral form, 
interwoven with myths and anecdotes, passed down the generations. 
Nepali history seems caught in a time warp where the same old 
hackneyed events unfailingly keep appearing in its unchanging 
form over and over again. For some strange reason the paradigm of 
social enquiry in the hills remains ossified and immune to the world 
of social and cultural theories. As a result the scholarship that 
comes out from here fails to situate itself on the broader canvas of 
postcolonial theoretical discourses in general and such on India in 
particular. One way of making amends to these inadequacies is by 
undertaking a comprehensive inter-textual analysis of the colonial 
discourse in all its varying forms, particularly the relation between 
colonial knowledge, power and domination. A cultural criticism of 
colonialism and its ‘technologies of rule’ will certainly open up new 
areas of research. 
                                                 
25 Omissi, op. cit., p.19. 
26 For a detailed discussion on the continuity and change in the recruitment 
policy, see Omar Khalidi, “Ethnic Group Recruitment in the Indian Army: The 
Contrasting Case of the Sikhs, Muslims, Gurkhas and Others”, Pacific Affairs, 
Vol.74, No.4, Winter 2001- 2002, pp. 529- 552. Also see his, ‘No basis in 
military bias”, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 19, 2006. 
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 The most striking aspect of the history of Darjeeling is the 
issue of “migration”. No one seems to be taking the issue head on.
27
 
The question of “migration” is used as a favourite stick to beat the 
community on most occasions.
28
  The point of contention seems to 
be centering around an innocuous sounding report by Dr. Campbell, 
who was appointed as the Superintendent of Darjeeling and who 
claimed to have raised the population from “not more than hundred 
souls in 1839 to about 10,000 in 1849, chiefly by immigration from 
the neighbouring states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.”
29
 All kinds 
of theories and counter theories have come up. The entire debate 
seems to be caught in a dangerous cycle of cause and effect or what 
is popularly known in migration theories as “push” and “pull” 
factors. But one feels that by oversimplifying the matter we are 
doing the greatest disservice to those who experienced it.  The 
question of migration should be properly theorised by rescuing it 
from this binarism and situating it in the prevailing colonial ‘racist 
ideologies that identified particular sections of the people as 
intrinsically and biologically suited for particular tasks’.
30
 When 
history is tinkered endlessly with an intention to pass some kind of 
a retrospective judgment on a community, it only becomes that 
much more hazier and confusing. 
 Darjeeling was sparsely populated when the British set their 
foot there. The boundaries with its neighbouring territories were 
notional and people from adjoining places would come for grazing 
sheep and cattle or for cutting firewood. But with the discovery of 
                                                 
27 Kumar Pradhan has dealt with the issue in part but there is a need for a more 
comprehensive research on it. See his, The Gorkha Conquest: The Process and 
Consequences of Unification of Nepal with Special Reference to Eastern Nepal, 
Oxford University Press, Calcutta, 1991, pp.178-179. 
28 See the chapter titled “A Historical Outline of the Migratory Movements”, in 
Gorkhaland Agitation: The Issues, An Information Document (A white paper 
issued by the Government of West Bengal, published by the Director of 
Information, Government of West Bengal, 1986.) pp.4-6. 
29 L. S. S. O’ Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers: Darjeeling, Logos Press, New 
Delhi, 1989, p.22.  
30 Ania Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism, Routledge, London, 2001, 
pp.125-126. 
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Darjeeling by the British as an ideal retreat, far removed from the 
“heat” and “dust” of the northern plains, much of the things 
changed. With the establishment of a ‘modern regime of power’ in 
Darjeeling, this wild frontier was gradually normalized into a “hill 
station”. Colonialism ended its fluidity by putting it firmly under 
the control of its knowledge system. This production of colonial 
knowledge about Darjeeling, to borrow from Sudipta Kaviraj, led to 
the refiguring of the ‘fuzzy’ identities into an ‘enumerated’ 
community.
31
 In fact, the production of knowledge later became a 
necessary tool of domination and control in the hands of the 
colonial state. This ‘anthropolisation of knowledge’ by the 
‘ethnographic state’ proceeded slowly in the context of myriad 
other interests and processes in this period. The decade of 1860 saw 
a veritable explosion in the production and circulation of Gazetteers 
and Manuals that included extensive reports on the manners and 
customs of the castes, tribes, and religion of the specific regions 
being studied.
32
 Census was one of the most widely used tools for 
‘transforming barbarism into civilized data, effecting a 
transformation of moral condemnation into moral basis of both 
science and state.’
33
 What was happening in the rest of colonial 
India was also happening in Darjeeling. The colonial state with its 
superior cognitive apparatus set about collecting “facts” and 
creating knowledge about Darjeeling and its inhabitants. Through 
an extensive use of, what Bernard Cohn calls the “investigative 
modality”,
34
 botanists and naturalists set about conducting studies 
on the local flora and fauna, local population, the products of which 
were voluminous treatises on the region’s plant species and other 
                                                 
31 Sudipta Sudipta, “On the Construction of Colonial Power, Structure, Discourse, 
Hegemony”, in Sudipta Kaviraj (ed.), Politics in India, Oxford University Press, 
Delhi, 1997, pp.156-157.  Also see his, “The Imaginary Institution of India”, in 
Partha Chatterjee (ed.), Subaltern Studies, Vol. VII, Oxford University Press, 
Delhi, 1993, pp.1-39. 
32 Nicholas B. Dirks, “The Ethnographic State”, in Saurabh Dube (ed.), 
Postcolonial Passages: Contemporary History Writing on India, Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi, 2004, p.70. 
33 Ibid., p.78. 
34 Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and Forms of Knowledge: The British in India, 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002, pp.4 -5. 
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information.
35
 Survey and cartography were used extensively in the 
‘geographical arrangement of knowledge necessary for state 
supervision’.
36
 The Darjeeling Municipality, one of the very few 
municipalities then in India, was established in 1850, and the first 
official census was carried out in 1872.  
 Coming back to the question of migration, the colonial state 
adopted specific theories and administrative practices while dealing 
with ‘frontiers’ and margins. The trajectory of the expansion of the 
colonial state’s sovereignty followed a distinct pattern, from the 
first outlining of territory and subjects to the reconstruction of the 
state and society. In considering the spread of the jurisdiction of the 
colonial state, Peter Robb talks about two types of borders and 
frontiers, viz., internal and external borders, and narrow and broad 
frontiers.
37
 The narrow external frontier was the one the colonial 
rulers sought to draw on the map. The broad internal borders, on the 
other hand, represented the one in which there were various layers 
or zones of contestation and influence rather than a definite line of 
demarcation between one jurisdiction and another. Moreover, 
within India the indeterminate zone of authority persisted, and was 
even encouraged by the colonial rulers for all their claims of 
sovereignty. The narrow frontier implied a single rule of law within 
a given territory. However, there were exceptions to this rule, 
mainly by excluding many aspects of life, classes of people and 
territories (non-regulation and frontier provinces, princely states 
and so on) these exceptions constituted the broad internal frontiers 
of British rule. This demarcation was not only a physical line; rather 
                                                 
35 For example, J. D. Hooker’s Himalayan Journals: Notes of a Naturalist in 
Bengal, the Sikkim and Nepal Himalayas, The Khasia Mountain, etc (2. vols.) 
Ward Lock and Co. Ltd., London, 1891. A. Campbell’s, “On the Tribes around 
Darjeeling”, Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London, Vol.7, 1869. 
36 Peter Pels, “From Text to Bodies: Brian Houghton Hodgson and the 
Emergence of Ethnology in India”, in Jan Van Bremen and Akitoshi Shimizu 
(ed.), Colonialism and Anthropology in Asia and Oceania, Curzon Press, Surrey, 
2000, pp. 66-68. 
37 Peter Robb, “The Colonial State and the Constructions of Indian Identity: An 
Example on the Northeast Frontier in the 1880s”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol.31, 
No.2, 1997, pp. 248-249. 
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it was a demarcation of the various realms of transitional 
sovereignty.
38
  
  A similar kind of territorial concepts was in practice in 
Nepal. The entire territorial domain was called muluk. The king saw 
himself as a landlord or malik of his territory. Within the muluk 
there was desa or realm over which the king exercised ritual 
authority. The realm was an auspicious icon of the universe 
centered on the temple of the king’s tutelary deity (Taleju) and 
demarcated on the perimeter by temples.
39
 The third concept was 
the notion of desa or des, meaning country. The “country” consisted 
of unique people who experienced a common moral and natural 
identity by virtue of their living and interacting in the same region. 
People of the same country spoke a common language, shared a 
common lore (of proverbs, stories and songs), and observed certain 
customary practices that objectified as a way of life of their 
country.
40
 Furthermore, the boundary of the possession depended 
on the collection of revenue. This boundary extended or receded 
depending upon the ambition and strength of the kings’ revenue 
collectors. The ritual boundary, on the other hand, was fixed in 
particular localities which might be outside the administrative 
boundaries.
41
 All these complexities both in colonial India and in 
Nepal point towards the fuzzy nature of the entire northern 
frontiers.  
 But the Nepalese did migrate to Munglan (the land of the 
Mughals), and their numbers kept increasing with the possibilities 
of starting tea and cinchona plantations in Darjeeling. Migration 
was encouraged by feeding the oppressed and brutalized people 
with stories like, chiya ko bot maa paisa falchha, meaning money 
grows on tea bushes. Migration was a painful experience, a tragic 
event in the lives of most people, even though in the Burghardian 
sense it was merely an act of ‘relinquishing one’s tenurial contract 
                                                 
38 Ibid., p. 250. 
39 Richard Burghart, “The Formation of the Concept of Nation – State in Nepal”, 
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. xliv, No.1, November 1984, pp.103-105. 
40 Ibid., p.106. 
41 Ibid. p.112. 
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in one polity and taking up in another polity within the “country”.’
42
 
Nepal was considered to be the land of the pure, leaving which 
meant permanent defilement. “Immigration” was encouraged by the 
colonial state, as it required cheap labour for building infrastructure 
for its “hill station”, and most importantly for its teeming tea 
gardens, which had by the turn of the century formed wonderful 
mosaic on those “virgin” hills. There is an interesting parallel 
between the discourse of “martial race” and the discourses that 
informed the decision to employ “Hill Coolies”. Just as the 
“Gurkha” soldier, simple and free of religious prejudices was better 
suited to serve in the British Indian Army, he was also thought to be 
a useful plantation worker as he was casteless, docile and 
hardworking hill-man. It was within the matrix of race relations in 
the colonial situation that the colonial capitalist enterprise (tea 
gardens) encouraged migration. The British planters did not fail in 
employing sardars (local appellation for agents) who would go to 
Nepal and bring back “young” and “healthy” labourers to work in 
their tea gardens. The sardars in return got commissions from the 
planters. Along with this, the sardars had the additional duty of 
enforcing discipline and attendance, for which ‘he got one pice 
(paise) for every worker turning up for work’.
43
   
 
 The most significant impact of colonial capitalism was that 
through its civilizing mission it transformed the docile and 
hardworking hill-man into a proto-wage labourer. The hill-man was 
turned into a reified commodity.
44
 Like elsewhere, the tea gardens 
in Darjeeling too provided ‘a massive spectacle of order, 
productivity and enterprise, a constant picture which provided the 
self-assurance that was so crucial to the European culture of 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p.108. 
43 E. C. Dozey, A Concise History of Darjeeling District Since 1835, Printed and 
Published by the Art Press, Wellington Square, Calcutta, 1916, p. 120. 
44 Kaushik Ghosh, “A Market for Aboriginality: Primitivism and Race 
Classification in the Indentured Labour Market of Colonial India”, in Gautam 
Bhadra, Gyan Prakash and Sussie Tharu (eds.), Subaltern Studies: Writings on 
South Asian History and Society, Vol. X, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 
1999, pp. 13-18. 
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colonial rule?’
45
  While the discourse of martial race had succeeded 
in creating the Gurkha regiments as a domain for continuous 
disciplining of the body of the “Gurkha”, the tea gardens on the 
other hand created a rival domain in which the “hill-man” was 
turned into a hard working labourer, disciplined and controlled by 
colonial science – the Imperial botany. The British Indian Army and 
the tea gardens while competing with each other completed the 
process of colonisation of the body of the “Gurkha”. 
 
The emergence of a community and the stirrings of an 
alternative identity  
Towards the middle of the nineteenth century the colonial state 
started consolidating its power through a series of territorial 
acquisitions from Sikkim and Bhutan. By early twentieth century 
the colonial state had firmly established itself as a ‘modern regime 
of power’. Like elsewhere the expansion of the colonial rule 
towards the frontiers like Darjeeling led to the ‘institution of 
European forms of civil society even though it always remained an 
incomplete project’. Furthermore, as Partha Chatterjee observes, the 
process of legitimation of the colonial state by creating a public 
domain in the form of civil society was fundamentally limited as it 
could confer only subjecthood on the colonised. The colonised in 
response refused to accept membership of this civil society of 
subjects and began constructing their identities within the narrative 
of community.
46
 Moreover, this civil society did not spread evenly, 
limiting itself to a small section of ‘citizens’ which meant that the 
enlightened elites often engaged in a pedagogical mission in 
relation to the rest of the society.
47
 Darjeeling also witnessed 
somewhat similar kind of developments. By the middle of the 
second decade of the last century there had emerged a sizeable 
middle class in Darjeeling. They often engaged in pedagogical 
missions, educating the masses for a need to form a strong 
                                                 
45 Ibid., p.14. 
46 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1995, p.237. 
47 Partha Chatterjee, “Beyond the Nation? Or Within?”, Social Text, Vol.16, 
No.3, Fall 1998, p.6. 
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community. Pratyoush Onta identifies general education and 
improvement of Nepali language and literature as the two special 
areas of emphasis of the reform movements of this time.
48
 A flurry 
of civil society organisations like the Nepali Sahitya Sammelan 
(1924), Gorkha Dukha Niwarak Sammelan (1932), Sri Hitkari 
Sammelan (1945), Himalaya Kala Mandir (1950) and many others 
emerged which were actively involved in redefining and creating a 
new self-identity based on the idea of kinship - Nepali daju bhai. 
Another major factor in this amalgamation was the standardization 
and universalisation of Nepali language. The efforts of these 
organisations and many other factors led to a pluralist synthesis of 
the myriad groups that together constituted the Gorkha jati, secured 
and sustained by a pluralist culture and imagination. In a rather 
strange way colonialism became, to invoke Marx, the “unconscious 
tool of history”, providing a basis for fashioning a new self-identity. 
This has led scholars like T. B. Subba to argue that nation building 
which has been the national goal of Nepal, to have realised itself 
outside the boundaries of Nepal.
49
   
 Here, it will be an interesting exercise to study the Gorkha 
subjectivity. To be sure, the problem of Gorkha subjectivity is not 
so much the problem of cultural displacement as it is a sense of 
being deterritorialised. There was a certain sense of lack that kept 
haunting him as he left his home and hearth. His subjectivity was 
bitterly torn between the calling of the home and the hard reality of 
never returning to see it again. There was optimism and hope when 
he said `suna ko lingo, chandi ko ping, ek jieu khana launa lai 
thikai chha Darjeeling’, meaning Darjeeling will take care of me. 
But there was also a fear of the uncertain. This liminality of the 
deterritorialised subject was clearly reflected in the cultural 
                                                 
48 Pratyoush Onta, “Creating a Brave Nepali Nation in British India: The Rhetoric 
of Jati Improvement, Rediscovery of Bhanubhakta and the Writing of Bir 
History”, Studies in Nepali History and Society, Vol.1, No. 1, June 1996, p.39. 
49 T B Subba, “Nepal and the Indian Nepalis”, in Kanak Mani Dixit and Shastri 
Ramachandran (eds.), State of Nepal, Himal Books, Kathmandu, 2002, p.126. 
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production of those times. It was not surprising that it created, to 
borrow a phrase from Appadurai, a `diasporic public sphere’, in 
which even while the nascent community was making ceaseless 
efforts to ground its new self-identity, was also at the same time 
lamenting the fact of leaving home. Nepal was present everywhere, 
within the subject as a memory, and more strongly in its literary 
utterances. The memory of migration was at once an occasion to 
feel lost, and also a historical moment from where one had to chart 
a different course of history. It was also a moment for readying 
oneself to the regimen of new life. People would often say ‘ek 
jhumro launchhu, ek mana khanchuu’, meaning “I will live 
frugally”.  
 This material history was subjectively reproduced in many 
famous literary works like Lil Bahadur Chhetri’s Basai and 
Brahmaputrako Chheu Chhau Maa, Laina Singh Bangdel’s Muluk 
Dekhi Bahira, Rudraraj Pande’s Prayaschit, Asit Rai’s Naya 
Chhitijko Khoj and many others that were based on the motif of 
exploitation and migration.
50
 This also explains the unprecedented 
popularity of Man Bahadur Mukhia’s Ani Deorali Roonchha, a play 
that captured the plight and oppression  of the people caught in the 
cycle of debt in late nineteenth century rural Nepal. Agam Singh 
Giri, in many ways, epitomises this double consciousness of the 
subject that swore by the primordial form of communal self-identity 
that was beginning to locate itself within a nation, which had just 
begun its career. In his works one can trace the self-identity 
constructing its moral ideological foundations on the spiritual 
conception of pahaad (hill), kamaan (tea garden), and maato (land). 
These ideological foundations were grounded on the notion of bir 
Gorkha jati which for its own historic reasons became the 
foundational narrative of a deterritorialised community recreating 
its home in a somewhat alien place. His poems like, “Mayaloo 
paakha chiyaabaari”, “Suna hai suna Nepali”, and “Pahaad ki 
                                                 
50 Michael Hutt, “Being Nepali without Nepal: Reflections on a South Asian 
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raani Darjeelinglai” exhort his fellow folks to reconcile to the 
reality of Darjeeling as their new home
51
. But there are also 
indications of a somewhat diasporic community’s yearning for 
home, located in the interstices of the text. The ambivalences of the 
subject stand out very clearly in poems like Meechi lai baato 
sodhera, Shri panch Maharajdhiraj prati pravasko sadhbhavna, 
and Samachar yahi bhanidinu.
52
   
  
The process of Gorkha identity formation was the product of 
the cultural renaissance in Darjeeling. However, this process of 
formation of a strong cultural identity in the shape of Nepali 
identity was again unsettled as it was relocated within the matrix of 
the national culture and identity of the Indian nation. The problem 
of identity arises when this national culture not only provides 
resources for defining the identities but also mediates it. National 
cultures, as Stuart Hall reminds us, are not composed of cultural 
institutions but of symbols and representations. Furthermore, 
national culture is a discourse - a way of constructing meanings that 
influences and organises both our actions and conceptions about 
ourselves. National cultures, he argues, construct identities by 
producing meanings about the nation with which we can identify.
53
 
Furthermore, the process of the formation of self-identity was 
dislocated by the Nepali historiography which while carving out a 
political space in the liberal nationalist imagination of India 
constituted its subjectivity in the pre-colonial Gorkha glory and 
bravery. It is not that there were no indigenous conceptions of 
martiality and valour. The problem with Gorkha history is that these 
very ideas and values were appropriated by the colonial state by 
giving a scientific sanctity to the great tradition. Thus the narrative 
of the bir Gorkha quite logically conflates with the discourse of 
“martial race”. It creates a peculiar situation in which the bir 
Gorkha is self-idealized and reified into a brave soldier but since the 
                                                 
51 See, Mohan Thakuri (ed.), Agamsingh Giri Rachna Sanchayan, Sahitya 
Akademi, New Delhi, 1992. 
52 See Bijay Kumar Rai (ed.), Agam Singh Giri Rachnaavali, Vol.1, Nirman 
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53 Stuart Hall, op. cit., pp.291-292. 
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identity is deeply implicated in the colonial history, it remains tied 
to the white master with feudal loyalties. In such a case 
ambivalence towards colonialism becomes inevitable. The Gorkha 
subject while attempting to liberate itself from the hegemony of 
colonial discourse creates a new subjectivity in the self-identity 
which is again reconstituted by the same discourse from which it 
came out. Thus, the emerging cultural identity of the Gorkha 
remains hostage to the racial identity inscribed on the body of the 
Gorkha by the white man through colonial state. Colonialism not 
only created hierarchy of knowledges, it also created a hierarchy of 
human beings in which the “Gurkha” was consigned to the role of a 
supplicant, first to the white man and then later to the inheritors of 
that colonial knowledge. 
 
The problem of Gorkha identity and the discourse of freedom  
The Gorkha identity has been treading a difficult path in which it 
has tried to strike a fine balance between its cultural identity and the 
demands of citizenship and national culture of India. The Gorkha 
identity constituted in the narrative of the community had to submit 
to the postcolonial state ‘embedded as it was within the universal 
narrative of capital which does not necessarily recognize within its 
jurisdiction any form of community except the single, determinate, 
demographically enumerable form of the nation.’
54
 The problem of 
the Gorkha identity arises from everyday experiences and the 
necessity to carve out a political space for its cultural identity in 
India. The identity often claims its legitimacy by citing its 
contribution to the anti-colonial struggles. This moral claim is often 
buttressed by the denial of history, the historical link with Nepal. 
Hence, the lexical juggleries like Indian–Nepali, Bharatiya-
Gorkhali or Bhargoli. Part of the problem also stems from the 
manner in which the Nepali historiography has charted its path. One 
feels that in these historical works there is no serious attempt to 
interrogate colonialism. One also senses a subtle fixation of our 
historians with colonial knowledge. There is an innate feeling that 
the native’s history can be authenticated only when it is culled from 
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Western sources - the Vansittarts, the Hookers, the   O’Malley’s. In 
effect, the very colonial discourses have become the canonical texts 
for the production of knowledge about the community both from 
without and from within. The native voice is often lost in the 
cacophony of the metropolitan and `mainstream’ voices. The 
immediate impact of this historiography is the endorsement of the 
idealised and orientalised identity as the self-identity. In other 
words, the historiography orientalises the Gorkha identity. As 
Edward Said would like to remind us, the Orient was Orientalised 
not only because it was discovered to be “Oriental” in all those 
ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth-century 
European but also because it could be – made Oriental.
55
 The 
colonial knowledge system at once participates in the construction 
of reality and also gets itself constructed.
56
 The true goal of the 
Gorkha historiography should be ‘to recover their own particular 
forms of subjectivity from the universalising modes and reconstitute 
them and restore in history’.
57
 There is a need to reconstitute the 
Gorkhas as a historical character, rehabilitate their consciousness 
and agency in history. This can be done by engaging with the 
canonical texts, reading them against their grain and unsettling the 
discourse. This will eventually liberate the Gorkha identity from the 
hegemony of discourse and the totalising tendencies of Western 
history.  
 
 The liberation of the Gorkha identity from the colonial 
discourse should create fertile grounds for further hybridisation of 
the identity and not towards essentialisation of identity. Identities, 
we must remind ourselves, are always hybridised. Identities often 
keep changing boundaries making culture the prime site of 
contestation of the multiple layers of identities. It should be thought 
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56 Ronald Inden, “Orientalist Construction of India”, Modern Asian Studies, 
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of as a ‘production’ which is never complete, always in process, and 
always constituted within, not outside, representation.
58
 The 
Gorkhas are spread across South Asia, most of them hybridised by 
the local traditions, languages, and cultures. In such a case, it will 
be more useful to think of the Gorkha identity as a post-national 
identity or a South Asian identity.  
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